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Abstract If an undertaking infringes European or national competition law, the
infringers must reckon with a large range of possible sanctions, of both a public law
and a private law nature. Regarding the latter, we take note in this paper of anti-trust
actions for damages by private claimants, which have become ever more significant
in the anti-trust debate. Against a background of divergent developments in the
European Member States, the European legislator has adopted Directive 2014/104/
EU (Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national
law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and
of the European Union Text with EEA relevance, OJ 2014 L 349, 1 ff (DADA)),
with the aim of facilitating the full compensation of damage suffered by those
affected by violations of European or national competition law, and to coordinate
public and private enforcement measures. The Member States must implement this
Directive into their national systems. This paper gives an overview of the Directive,
analyses its most important provisions, and then discusses the international issues
raised in cases concerning cross-border anti-competitive activities.
This article is based on a presentation given at the 3rd China-EU Legal Forum (CELF) which took place
at the Supreme Court of Cassation in Rome on 8./9.9.2015. The 3rd CELF was co-organised by the
China Law Society, the Bar Association of Rome, the International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law (UNIDROIT), the China-EU School of Law at the China University of Political Science and Law
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1 Introduction
If an undertaking infringes EU competition rules, namely Art 101, 102 TFEU,1 or
national competition laws, such as theGermanAct against Restraints on Competition2
or theAustrianCartelAct 2005,3 for instance, then itmust traditionally reckonwith the
possibility of public law sanctions. Themost important of these—and arguably the one
which dominatesmedia coverage in this area—are fines, whichmay be imposed by the
European Commission, or else by the National Competition Authorities (NCAs).4
Over the past years, developments in Brussels have been influenced by the
change in the office of the European Competition Commissioner: Joaquı´n Almunia
left the office, to be succeeded byMargrethe Vestager. Almunia’s legacy is no mean
one; his final year brought substantial fines, totalling approximately EUR 1.69
billion,5 including a staggering EUR 953 million penalty imposed on six companies
for their participation in an automotive ball bearings cartel.6 Other notable 2014
penalties included fines on a manufacturer of high-voltage power cables
(EUR 302 m),7 three manufacturers of car seat foam (EUR 114 m),8 four smart
card chip producers (EUR 138 m),9 and several financial services institutions for
colluding on Swiss franc interest rate derivatives (EUR 94 m).10
There is a basic rule that EU competition law takes precedence (in application) over
the anti-trust lawsof theEuropeanMemberStates.11However, EUcompetition lawonly
covers offences that extend, at the least in their impact, beyond the borders of any single
Member State, and thus affect the European Single Market. Cartels and abusive
practices by undertakings with a dominant market position that do not affect intra-
1 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) OJ 2010 C 83, 47.
2 German Act against Restraints on Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschra¨nkungen, GWB)
German Federal Law Gazette (dBGBl.) I 2013, 1750 in the version valid on 1.10.2014, dBGBl I 2014,
1066.
3 Austrian Cartel Act (Bundesgesetz gegen Kartelle und andere Wettbewerbsbeschra¨nkungen -
Kartellgesetz 2005, KartG 2005) Austrian Federal Law Gazette (o¨BGBl) I No 61/2005.
4 See no A.Part I.I.A.1.a)i)3, infra.
5 Even this fell short of the 2013 figure, when fines totalled EUR 1.9 bn.
6 Commission Decision of 19.3.2014 (Case AT.39922—Bearings), Official Journal (OJ) C 238,
23.7.2014, 10–12. Notably, JKETK, a Japanese company, received full immunity for blowing the whistle
on the cartel.
7 Commission Decision of 2.4.2014 (Case AT.39610—Power Cables), OJ C 319, 17.9.2014, 10–15.
8 Commission Decision of 29.1.2014 (Case AT.39801—Foam), OJ C 354, 8.10.2014, 6–9.
9 Commission Decision of 3.9.2014 (Case AT.39574—Smart Card Chips), unpublished.
10 Commission Decision of 21.10.2014 (Case AT.39924—Swiss Franc Related Derivatives), unpub-
lished. UBS and Barclays received full immunity from prosecution for whistle-blowing on the cartel and
cooperating with the Commission, saving them colossal fines of EUR 2.5 bn and EUR 690 m
respectively. Several other banks received substantial reductions in fines for cooperating.
11 Art 3 para 2 (1) Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of
the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L 001, 1–25.
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(Member) State trade remain under the jurisdiction of the national legislator and the
NCAs. These national competition authorities also handed out enormous fines in recent
years against many companies; the German Bundeskartellamt alone clocked up almost
EUR 1 billion,12 in 2014 fining—among others—beer brewers (EUR 338 million),13
sugar producers (EUR 280million),14 and sausage manufacturers (EUR 338million).15
TheFrenchAutorite´ de la concurrence imposed recordfines ofEUR1.09billion, among
others againstmanufacturers of household and hygiene products.16 InAustria, the courts
had already imposed fines of about EUR 25million in 2013 based solely on applications
by the independent Bundeswettbewerbsbeho¨rde.17
Thosewhoengage in anti-competitive activities are, however, not only facedwith the
possibility of hefty fines and other public law sanctions, but also with civil law
consequences, such as court actions brought by other enterprises and other non-state, i.e.
private, persons who have sustained losses as a result of such anti-competitive conduct.
Besides injunctions, such actions seek compensation for harm sustained due to the
offence. The CJEU held as early as 1964, in the Case Costa/ENEL,18 that it is not only
the Member States which are the legal subjects of the European legal order established
by European primary law, but also individuals, who are subject to duties under
Community law and of course also have rights under the same law. Hence, it has been
established since the 1960s that anti-competitive conduct can trigger an entitlement to
compensationon the part of third parties under theEuropean legal system. In1974, in the
Case BRT I,19 the CJEU also recognised that the (now) Art 101 and 102 TFEU have
direct effect as between individuals, and directly give rise to rights in those persons
which must be upheld in the courts of the Member States. Originally, the CJEU—not
following the opinion of Advocate General van Gerven20—rejected the idea of a
compensation claim directly derived from European primary law in 1994 in the Banks
Case.21 It was only with the suitably-named Courage Case22 in 2001 that the
12 Bundeskartellamt,online, http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/
2014/23_12_2014_Jahresr%C3%BCckblick.html?nn=3591568 (31.3.2015).
13 Bundeskartellamt, online http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entschei-dung/DE/Fallberichte/
Kartellverbot/2014/B10-105-11.pdf;jsessionid=DE393BCB2B8E5840ECD494C88D38EE7B.1_cid371?_
blob=publicationFile&v=1 (31.3.2015).




16 Autorite´ de la concurrence, E vom 18.12.2014, 14-D-19, http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/
avisdec.php?numero=14D19 (31.3.2015).
17 Bundeswettbewerbsbeho¨rde, Ta¨tigkeitsbericht 2013 (2014), 37.
18 CJEU 15.7.1964 –6/64, Costa/Enel, ECLI:EU:C:1954:66; cf also CJEU 5.2.1963—26/62, Van Gend
& Loos, ECLI:EU:1963:1.
19 CJEU 30.1.1974—127/73, BRT/SABAM, ECLI:EU:C:1974:6; cf also CJEU 18.3.1997—C-282/95 P,
Gue´rin automobiles/Kommisson, ECLI:EU:C: 1997:159.
20 Opinion of the Advocate General van Gerven 13.4.1994—C-128/92, Banks & Co/British Coal
Corporation, ECLI:EU:C:1993:860, no 44, 45.
21 CJEU 13.4.1994—C-128/92, Banks & Co/British Coal Corporation, ECLI:EU:C:1994:130.
22 CJEU 20.9.2001—C-453/99, Courage/Crehan, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465, no 26.
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LuxembourgCourt revised this position; nowadays it is settled case law that there can be
a compensation claim directly based on the TFEU.23
Such anti-trust claims for damages are being raised more often before some
European Member States’ courts;24 notably in Germany,25 the Netherlands,26 and
the United Kingdom.27 On the other hand, however, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to pursue such anti-trust actions in numerous other Member States.28 In an Impact
Assessment Report,29 the European Commission states that as far as it is aware only
a little over a quarter of all competition law infringements upheld in Commission
decisions from 2006 to 2012 resulted in one or more follow-on actions for
damages.30 Moreover, so-called stand-alone actions, brought without a breach first
being found by a competition authority, are extremely rare.31 So far, only a fraction
of the damage caused by competition law infringements has resulted in such claims,
although the extent of this damage ranges from around EUR 5.6–23.3 billion per
year.32 Thus the wrongful benefit remains in the hands of the offenders in a clear
majority of cases.
Facing this discrepancy in a pivotal policy area of the European Union, it is
hardly very surprising that the European legislator has been on the move, first
23 CJEU 13.7.2006—C-295–298/04, Manfredi, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461, no 61; CJEU 14.6.2011—C-360/
09, Pfleiderer, ECLI:EU:C:2011:389; CJEU 6.11.2012—C-199/11, Otis uA, ECLI:EU:C:684, no 40;
CJEU 6.6.2013—C-536/11, Donau Chemie, ECLI:EU:C:2013:366, no 21.
24 Cf Cortese, Private Antitrust Enforcement—Status Quo in Italy, EuZW 2012, 730; Garzaniti/
Vanhulst/Oeyen, Private Antitrust Enforcement—Status Quo in Belgium, EuZW 2012, 691; Kofler-
Senoner/Siebert, Die private Durchsetzung von kartellrechtlichen Anspru¨chen—Status Quo in O¨sterreich,
EuZW 2012, 650;Makatsch/Mir, Die neue EU-Richtlinie zu Kartellschadensersatzklagen—Angst vor der
eigenen ,,Courage‘‘? EuZW 2015, 7; Motyka-Mojkowski, Die private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung—Status
Quo in Polen, EuZW 2012, 817; Vogel, Die private Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts—Status Quo in
Frankreich, EuZW 2012, 897; Vollrath, Das Maßnahmepaket der Kommission zum wettbewerb-
srechtlichen Schadenersatzrecht, NZKart 2013, 434.
25 Cf § 33 GWB. Naturally, nowhere near all of the issues raised by private actions based on competition
law breaches have been resolved in Germany either, cf e.g. Regional Court (LG) of Du¨sseldorf
17.12.2013, 37 O 200/09, BB 2014, 149; Alexander, Wege und Irrwege—Europa¨isierung im Kartell- und
Lauterbarkeitsrecht, GRUR Int 2013, 636, Zo¨ttl/Schlepper, Die private Durchsetzung von kartell-
rechtlichen Schadensersatzanspru¨chen—Status Quo in Deutschland, EuZW 2012, 573.
26 Cf Commission, Impact Assessment Report, COM(2013) 404 final = SWD(2013) 204 final
(hereinafter Impact Assessment Report) no 52; Kortmann/Swaak, Private Antitrust Enforcement—Status
Quo in the Netherlands, EuZW 2012, 770; Makatsch/Mir, EuZW 2015, 7; Mederer, Richtlinienvorschlag
u¨ber Schadenersatzklagen im Bereich des Wettbewerbsrechts, EuZW 2013, 847 (848).
27 Cf sec 47A Competition Act 1998. In the light of schedule 8 Draft Consumer Rights Bill, further
changes favourable to private claimants can be anticipated in the Competition Act 1998 and Enterprise
Act 2002; with respect, for example, to the status of the Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT) as the main
court for private anti-trust actions. Koch/Thiede, ETL 2014, no 2 Fn 13; Peyer, Die private Durchsetzung
von kartellrechtlichen Anspru¨chen—Status Quo in England und Wales, EuZW 2012, 617.
28 Cf even just the critical assessment byMa¨sch, Private Anspru¨che bei Versto¨ßen gegen das europa¨ische
Kartellverbot—,,Courage‘‘ und die Folgen, EuR 2003, 825 (823).
29 Commission, Impact Assessment Report, SWD(2013) 204 final.
30 In 15 out of 54 Cases, Commission, Impact Assessment Report SWD(2013) 204 final, no 52.
31 Mederer, EuZW 2013, 847 (848); Urlesberger/Ditz, CJEU overturns Austrian rule on access to files in
anti-trust proceedings, O¨ZK 2013, 135 (138).
32 Commission, Impact Assessment Report SWD(2013) 204 final, no 67, 102, 172.
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publishing a green paper in 2005,33 followed by a white paper in 2008.34 A mere
5 years later, in July 2013, the European Commission adopted a whole package of
measures; the centrepiece of these was the Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under
national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member
States and of the European Union.35 Parallel to this, the European Commission
issued a communication on the most common economic methods for quantifying
anti-trust damages when compensation claims are brought subsequent to compe-
tition law breaches,36 supplemented by a Recommendation for collective legal
protection,37 as well as a comprehensive ‘Practical Guide’.38
The EU Council of Ministers passed the draft Directive on 10.11.2014,39 the
European Parliament also approved the proposal and the President of the European
Parliament signed the Directive on 26.11.2014. Now the ball is in the Member States’
court. They must transpose this Directive on certain rules for actions for damages
under domestic law based on breaches of competition law provisions of the Member
States and the EU (hereinafter: Directive on Anti-Trust Damages Actions or DADA)
into national law within 2 years of its coming into force,40 i.e. by 27.12.2016.
33 Commission, Green Paper, Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672 final.
34 Commission, White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165
final.
35 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of
the Member States and of the European Union, COM(2013) 404 final, cf from among the (abundant)
literature on the proposal, and with further references: Fiedler, Der aktuelle Richtlinienvorschlag der
Kommission—der große Wurf fu¨r den kartellrechtlichen Schadenersatz? BB 37/2013, 2179; Fiedler/
Huttenlauch, Der Schutz von Kronzeugen- und Settlementerkla¨rungen vor der Einsichtnahme durch
Dritte nach dem Richtlinien-Vorschlag der Kommission, NZKart 2013, 350; Howard, Too little, too late?
The European Commission’s Legislative Proposals on Anti-Trust Damages Actions, JECLAP 2013, Vol
4, No 6, 455; Koch/Thiede, European Union in: Karner/Steininger (ed) European Tort Law (ETL) 2013
(2014) 699, no 3; Pfeffer/Rummel, Die Zukunft privater Schadenersatzklagen nach dem Richtlinienen-
twurf der Kommission vom 11.06.2013, WuW 02/2014, 172; Polster/Steiner, Zur Passing-on defense im
o¨sterreichischen Kartellschadenersatzrecht, O¨ZK 2014, 43; Mederer, EuZW 2013, 847 ff; Rittenauer/
Bru¨ckner, Sonderschadenersatzrecht fu¨r Kartellgescha¨digte, wbl 2014, 301; Schuhmacher, Schadener-
satzklagen im Wettbewerbsrecht—der Richtlinienvorschlag der Kommission, ecolex 2014, 193; Schwab,
Finding the Right Balance—the Deliberations of the European Parliament on the Draft Legislation
Regarding Damage Claims, JECLAP, 2014, Vol 5, No 2, 65; Steiner, Der neue RL-V der Kommission
zum Private Enforcement, ecolex 2013, 1000; Weitbrecht, Schadenersatzanspru¨che der Unternehmer und
Verbraucher wegen Kartellversto¨ßen, NJW 2012, 881.
36 Commission, Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based
on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Text with EEA
relevance, OJ 2013 C 167, 19.
37 Commission, Recommendation on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory Collective
Redress Mechanisms in the Member States concerning Violations of Rights granted under EU Law, OJ
2013 L 201, 60.
38 Commission, Practical Guide on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article
101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, SWD(2013) 205.
39 Poland, Slovenia and Germany declined to vote in the Council at the time due to dissatisfaction with
the rules on joint and several liability (cf no 40, infra), cf Council Document 14680/14 ADD 1 = 2013/
0185 (COD).
40 Art 23 Directive.
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2 Typical cases
In practice, the most common type of case, which is also used as the basis for this
paper, runs as follows: commercial undertakings in a certain field have engaged in
anti-competitive activities over years. They have made horizontal41 or vertical
arrangements42; or, alternatively, one or more businesses with a dominant market
position has abused its power in an anti-competitive fashion43 so as to obtain higher
prices than would in all likelihood be achieved were competition undistorted. The
cartel has been discovered by a competition authority or (more likely) one of the
cartel members has blown the whistle; the members of the cartel have been fined
heavily by the competition authority.44 The majority of the undertakings that
participated in the activities have admitted this in the course of the proceeding
before the relevant authority in order to be eligible for leniency programs or to
benefit from other bonus rules.
3 An overview of the Directive
The legal basis for the DADA is Art 103 TFEU (competition) and 114 TFEU
(Common Market). This double basis was necessary because—as explained
above—the harmonisation of the rules of the Member States in this respect
concerns both actions for damages based on breaches of EU competition law and on
breaches of national law; Art 103 TFEU would not have been sufficient as a basis
for the harmonisation of national laws.45
Methodologically speaking, the DADA is very obviously based on the idea of
creating a uniform European approach while at the same time trying to avoid any
unnecessary interference with national procedural and liability rules. The primary aim
of theDADA is to give victims effectivemeans of recourse to obtain full compensation
for the actual loss they have suffered, as well as any loss of profit, including interest.46
Naturally, such full compensation is nothing new; the same was already set out by the
CJEU in the Manfredi Case.47 Besides creating the means to bring actions for
damages, the DADA is also intended to promote consensual dispute resolution.48
41 This includes, for instance, specific practices such as the formation of cartels, collusion, conspiracy,
mergers, predatory pricing, price discrimination and price-fixing agreements. See references in no 21,
infra and Rittenauer/Bru¨ckner, Der Richtlinienvorschlag der Europa¨ischen Kommission zu Schadener-
satzklagen im Kartellrecht, wbl 2014, 303 (309).
42 This includes practices such as exclusive dealing, geographic market restrictions, refusal to deal/sell,
resale price maintenance and tied selling.
43 For example, with strategies to impede or exploit competitors and suppliers.
44 Cf references in no 2, supra. For the question at issue here, it is of no relevance whether the
proceedings took place before the Commission or the national competition authority. Weitbrecht, NJW
2012, 881 (881).
45 Cf Recitals 8, 9 DADA.
46 Art 4; Art 2 (2) DADA; Recital 12 DADA.
47 CJEU 13.7.2006—C-295–298/04, Manfredi, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461.
48 Art 18-19 DADA.
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The DADA consists of a total of 24 articles, spread out over an introductory
(covering subject matter, scope and definitions) and five further chapters,
specifically the disclosure of evidence (chapter II), the effect of national decisions,
limitation periods and joint and several liability (chapter III), the passing-on of
overcharges (chapter IV), the quantification of harm (chapter V), consensual
dispute resolution (chapter VI) and the final provisions on review, transposition,
temporal application and entry into force (chapter VII).
From a practical perspective, it is worth noting, in particular, the rules on
disclosure of evidence in actions for damages: the parties can obtain competition
authorities’ evidence and then use this before a court in private law actions. While
this is good news for the practitioner, it is clearly problematic for the European
Commission and the NCAs; cartels are often only exposed by whistle-blowers—
often members of the same cartel. There are specific rules in the DADA to protect
whistle-blowers49 (and thus maintain the incentive to expose anti-competitive
behaviour), which govern the interplay between public and private enforcement of
competition law.50
4 The DADA in detail
4.1 Who can be sued?
Under Art 1 para 1 DADA, all undertakings or associations of undertakings
(assumed perpetrators of European or national competition law) can be sued;
notably, the DADA uses this established European term ‘undertaking’. Thus, in
accordance with how directives function as set out in Art 288 TFEU, the European
term ‘undertaking’ is introduced into the liability, competition and procedural laws
of the Member States.51
The CJEU decision in the Case Akzo52 is a good example of how this
harmonisation can work well. This case concerned the liability of a parent company
for anti-competitive activities by its subsidiary. Until this judgment it was
undisputed that liability must be assumed when the parent company has a
controlling influence on the subsidiary; the CJEU held then that there is also a
rebuttable presumption that when the parent company owns 100% of the capital in
the subsidiary it does exercise a controlling influence on this subsidiary’s conduct.
Further, the parent company is in particular accountable for the subsidiary’s conduct
if the subsidiary, despite having separate legal personality, largely follows the
instructions of the parent company rather than autonomously determining its own
market activities. The decision is of great practical benefit, because in the future
parent companies will not be able to avoid civil liability by simply letting their
49 Art 6 (6) lit a, Art 11 (4–6) DADA.
50 Recitals 24, 26 and 27 DADA.
51 Kersting, Die neue Richtlinie zur privaten Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht, WuW 2014, 564 (565);
Makatsch/Mir, EuZW 2015, 7.
52 CJEU 10.9.2009—C-97/08 P, Akzo/Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2009:536, no 59.
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subsidiaries become insolvent. Based on this decision, the claimant can recover not
only from the assets of the subsidiary, but also from those of the group parent
company.53
4.2 Standing; passing-on defence
Art 2 DADA contains a rule on who can bring actions for damages. This is set out in
line with the ‘any individual’ formulation of the CJEU in Courage54; it covers all
natural and legal persons that have suffered harm due to infringement of European
or national competition law.
According to the express wording of Art 12 DADA, this also includes indirect
victims, i.e. it takes account of the interplay between direct and indirect purchasers.
If a cartel overcharges for goods, it is often not only those who purchase directly
from the infringer who are affected. In many cases, goods are sold on down a chain,
sometimes after further processing. If the direct purchaser can in turn pass on the
anti-competitive price to those who purchase from him, these indirect purchasers
also suffer pecuniary damage. The question of the standing of such indirect
purchasers was largely controversial in the Member States up until now; for
instance, the German Federal Court of Justice only affirmed such a right to standing
following the decision ORWI in 2011.55
As shown above, the question of standing for indirect purchasers is closely linked
with the damage suffered by the direct purchaser, i.e. the intermediary trader. In the
first instance, this means merely that the indirect purchaser only suffers damage if
the purchaser further up the chain passes on the anti-competitive price to his own
customers, i.e. the indirect purchasers. However, if the claimant can pass his loss on
to the next level in the market, he has not actually suffered damage to this full
extent. In this context, Germanic lawyers speak of ‘Vorteilsausgleichung’ (roughly
translating as ‘off-setting the advantage gained’), in the general context here it is
taken into account in the passing-on defence.56
In Art 13, the DADA provides for just such a passing-on defence; the defendant
infringer can invoke the defence that the interim trader bringing the action passed on
all or part of the overcharge. The burden of proof in this respect is on the defendant;
as such he can accordingly require disclosure by the claimant or third parties.
53 Recital 11 DADA; Kersting, WuW 2014, 564 (565); Makatsch/Mir, EuZW 2015, 7; cf also Vollrath,
NZKart 2013, 434 (438) on the nexus between being subject to proceedings imposing fines and actions
for damages, doubtful with respect to the need for amendments in German law Stauber/Schaper, Die
Kartellschadensersatzrichtlinie—Handlungsbedarf fu¨r den deutschen Gesetzgeber?, NZKart 2014, 346
(347).
54 CJEU 20.9.2001—C-453/99, Courage/Crehan, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465, no 26.
55 BGH 28.06.2011—KZR 75/10, ORWI, BGHZ 190, 145, no 20 f = BeckRS 2011, 26581 = BB 2012,
75 = EuZW 2012, 103 = GRUR 2012, 291 (Comm Ackermann, Franck) = GRUR-Prax 2011, 543
(Comm Seitz) = GWR 2012, 10 (Comm Hooghoff) = JuS 2012, 847 (Comm Emmerich) = JZ 2012,
789 = NJW 2012, 103 = WRP 2012, 209 = WuW 2012, 57 = ZIP 2012, 390.
56 Cf in detail and with further references Polster/Steiner, O¨ZK 2014, 43 as well as BGH 28.06.2011—
KZR 75/10, ORWI, BGHZ 190, 145; Court of Appeal [2008] EWCA Civ 1086, no 109, 114, 147, 151—
Devenish Nutrition v. Sanofi-Aventis SA (France and others); High Court of Justice (Chancery division)
[2009] EWHC 741 (Ch), no 36—Emerald Supplies v. British Airways.
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Besides this, under Art 12 para 5 DADA, the courts deciding the case are entitled to
estimate the share of the overcharge passed on. The purpose of the rule is quite
clear—intermediate traders who bring such claims must not be over-compensated
(Art 12 para 2 DADA)—but, in my view, this construction certainly runs the risk of
being too generous to the defendant. On the one hand, the defendant does not in fact
have to provide complete proof, since the court may estimate the overcharge, whilst
on the other, the option of requiring disclosure from the claimant means the
defendant could delay the proceedings and obtain internal data from the claimant,
and thus build up a certain level of intimidation with the aim of forcing a settlement.
Any follow-on actions claims are likely to be little served by this rule.
4.3 Harm
In line with the CJEU decisions Courage and Manfredi,57 it ought to be possible to
seek full compensation. Sedes materiae is Art 3 para 1 DADA whereby ‘…any
natural or legal person who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of
competition law is able to claim and to obtain full compensation for that harm….’.
Such full compensation also includes the compensation of lost profits (lucrum
cessans), plus interest from the point at which the harm was sustained;58 this will
make for significant sums, especially when it comes to long-running cartels.59
Actually quantifying the damage suffered from competition law infringements is
one of the most difficult obstacles to actions for damages, so much so that the
European legislator also supplies recommendations on such procedures. In the light
of Recitals 45 and 46 DADA, the starting point must be that the quantification of
anti-trust damage is very complicated with respect to establishing and evaluating the
facts, and necessitates the use of complex economic models; moreover, obtaining
data and carrying out the calculations is expensive and specialists are essential. The
Commission’s ‘Practical Guide’ is therefore intended to simplify the quantification
of harm caused by cartels, and, in particular, to guarantee uniform procedure across
the Member States when it comes to assessing the harm.60 Furthermore, the DADA
states that the national competition authorities can assist the courts with quantifying
the harm.61 The Impact Assessment Report showed62 that in about 95% of the
cartels analysed there were definitely overcharges; accordingly, the DADA takes a
decisive further step: under Art 17 para 2 DADA, there is a rebuttable presumption
that cartel infringements cause harm.
57 CJEU 20.9.2001—C-453/99, Courage/Crehan, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465; CJEU 13.7.2006—C-295–298/
04, Manfredi, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461.
58 Art 3 (2), Art 12 (3) Directive; CJEU 13.7.2006—C-295–298/04, Manfredi, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461,
no 97.
59 Koch/Thiede, ETL 2014 (2015) no 5.
60 Commission, Practical Guide on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article
101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, SWD(2013) 205.
61 Art 17 (3) DADA.
62 Commission, Impact Assessment Report SWD(2013) 204 final.
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As might be expected, this presumption is the subject of vehement debate in
Austria,63 because tort law concepts there are rooted in the incidence of damage,
which the claimant always has to prove. From an Austrian perspective, therefore,
any presumption of damage constitutes a quite substantial interference in national
tort law. When a European rule has such a great impact on one national tort law, it is
often useful to review the exact reservations advocated there. One major argument
in the Austrian literature, that a quota cartel does not necessarily result in harm to
the other market participants,64 may sound quite persuasive. However, when such
conduct is seen in the light of Community law (as it must be),65 it becomes evident
that a quota cartel is nothing more than a production cartel—and, hence, the
argument raised must be disregarded. On the other hand, we have to concede that
proving damage always represents a substantial enough problem in any action for
damages exceeding a certain level of complexity, and mostly requires an economic
understanding of the facts. To that extent, the fears being nursed might be well-
founded, and the presumption of harm in the DADA could serve as a negative
example for future legal unification projects by the European legislator. In any case,
though, it is to be expected that numerous Member States will implement the
presumption of damage extremely narrowly and explicitly limit it to cartels.66
Even where damage is presumed—alleviating an obstacle to successful actions—
at the end of the day the judge will have to put a figure on it. This remaining hurdle
is eased by Art 17 para 1 DADA, according to which the Member States must
ensure that quantification of the extent of the damage does not render it practically
impossible for the victim to exercise his right to compensation. Hence, domestic
courts ultimately should have the right to estimate the amount of damage when it
has been proven that a claimant suffered harm but it is excessively difficult to
quantify its extent on the basis of the available evidence.
4.4 Disclosure of evidence
The potentially high damage awards give the claimant a clear incentive to file an
action. Obviously the risk of litigation must be considered; we note that in this type
of cases a double-digit number of joint defendants, and consequently considerable
costs,67 must be anticipated. The excessive volume of litigation rests very decisively
on the available evidence for anti-competitive conduct. This evidence is, however,
63 Rittenauer/Bru¨ckner, wbl 2014, 303 (309).
64 Rittenauer/Bru¨ckner, wbl 2014, 303 (309).
65 CJEU 16.5.2013—C-228/11, Melzer/MF Global UK Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2013:305, no 32-35; CJEU
21.6.1978—150/77, Bertrand, ECLI:EU:1978:1431, no 14–16; CJEU 17.06.1992—C-26/91, Handte,
ECLI:EU:C:1992:268, no 19; CJEU 19.1.1983—C-89/91, Shearson Lehman Hutton,
ECLI:EU:C:1993:15, no 13; CJEU 3.7.1997—C-269/95, Benincasa, ECLI:EU:C:1997:337, no 12;
CJEU 27.4.1999—C-99/96, Mietz, ECLI:EU:C:1999:202, no 26; CJEU 11.6.2002, C-96/00, Gabriel,
ECLI:EU:C:2002:436.
66 Rittenauer/Bru¨ckner, wbl 2014, 303 (309).
67 Buntscheck, ‘‘Private Enforcement’’ in Deutschland: Einen Schritt vor und zwei Schritte zuru¨ck, WuW




hard to come by:68 neither press releases from the European or national competition
authorities, nor public reporting contain information that will stand up in court. The
information provided by the national authorities is currently limited: arguably
claimants only get access to the index of files and anonymised decisions on the fines
imposed, in each case with information that can hardly be used.69 Understandably,
potential claimants abstain from making claims in this situation.
However, the proof is out there, which is why the European legislator aims to
compel access to evidence of the infringement in the hands of the defendants, third
parties or competition authorities70: Art 5 and 6 DADA provide that domestic courts
are entitled to order disclosure by competition authorities, the defendant, and third
parties of specific evidence and relevant categories of evidence (Art 5 para 2, Art 6
para 9 DADA), and can penalise failure to do so (Art 8 DADA).
In order to avoid any actions to discover internal information on (potential)
claimants or competitors, there must be a substantiated, reasoned application for the
disclosure which plausibly supports the claim for damages.71 For the same reason,
under Art 5 para 3 DADA the court must, in addition to examining whether the
disclosure is necessary, weigh up whether it is proportionate given the likelihood of
infringement, the extent and costs of the disclosure, and how confidential the
relevant information is. According to Art 5 para 4 s 2 DADA, confidential
information must be protected, and under Art 5 para 7 DADA parties affected must
be heard before the disclosure. Art 6 DADA adds specific provisions on court
disclosure of evidence from competition authority files to these general consider-
ations on disclosure of evidence.
A problem associated with leniency programs72 which has also been at issue
before the CJEU must be considered too: Austrian competition authorities had—
with reference to such programs for whistle-blowers and the corresponding rule in §
39 (2) of the Austrian Cartel Act (Kartellgesetz), which makes access to the court
files contingent upon the ‘consent of the competition law rules infringer’73—refused
to make relevant evidence accessible. The CJEU held in this respect that ‘in the
absence of binding regulation under European Union law’74 it is up to the domestic
courts, ‘on the basis of their national law, to determine the conditions under which
such access must be permitted or refused by weighing the interests protected by
68 Recitals 14 and 45 DADA.
69 Makatsch/Mir, EuZW 2015, 7 (8).
70 Cf on this in particular CJEU 14.6.2011—C-360/09, Pfleiderer, ECLI:EU:C:2011:389, no 23; CJEU
6.6.2013—C-536/11, Donau Chemie, ECLI:EU:C:2013:366, no 25.
71 All evidence or categories of evidence must be determined as precisely as possible. The claimant must
present the facts and evidence accessible with reasonable efforts which deliver plausible grounds for
suspecting an infringement of competition law, as well as the existence of damage and a causal link
between the infringement and the damage. If the evidence is in the sphere of a third party or the
defendants, the relevance of such to substantiating the claimant’s claim must be proven. Makatsch/Mir,
EuZW 2015, 7 (9); Mederer, EuZW 2013, 847 (849); Koch/Thiede, ETL 2014, no 8.
72 See no 8, supra.
73 In detail on the facts: AG Ja¨a¨skinen—C-536/11, Donau Chemie, ECLI:EU:C:2013:67, no 51.
74 CJEU 14.6.2011—C-360/09, Pfleiderer, ECLI:EU:C:2011:389, no 23; cf also ECJCJEU 6.6.2013—
C-536/11, Donau Chemie, ECLI:EU:C:2013:366, no 25.
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European Union law’.75 Moreover, the CJEU concluded with respect to consider-
ations regarding the protection of leniency programs that ‘they do not necessarily
mean that that access may be systematically refused’ and formulated case-by-case76
standards for assessment.77
As we have seen, public prosecution of anti-competitive conduct largely depends
on whistle blowing. It is vital which documents must be protected on a permanent or
temporary basis by the national and European competition authorities. Necessarily,
this puts a focus on how the treatment of whistle-blowers and their testimony is
regulated; the crucial voluntary cooperation of undertakings with the competition
authorities in order to expose cartels, which otherwise would become less likely for
fear of possible later disclosure, is of course undisputed. Accordingly, Art 6 para 6
DADA prohibits the court disclosure of ‘leniency statements’78 and ‘settlement
submissions’.79 However, the relevant national court confronted with this issue must
ensure, upon reasoned application by the claimant, that actual leniency statements
and settlement submissions are really at issue, as described in detail by the
definitions of these terms in Art 2 para 16 and para 18 DADA; the corresponding
contents of the document cannot be passed on and the authors must also be given the
opportunity to be heard. The rule in Art 6 para 5 DADA furthermore protects
proceedings before competition authorities, providing that the courts may only order
the disclosure of certain information after such proceedings have concluded; this
includes information that was put together for the competition authority’s
proceeding, and by the competition authority and communicated to the parties,80
as well as settlement submissions that have been withdrawn. In comparison to the
provisions of Art 5 and Art 6 para 4 DADA, this sets higher proportionality
standards in relation to the disclosure of competition authority evidence; the
claimant’s application must be sufficiently specific and the court must also take into
account ‘the need to safeguard the effectiveness of the public enforcement of
competition law.’ Further, it must be the case that no party or third party can
reasonably provide the information.81 Art 7 DADA sets out restrictions for evidence
that is obtained by access to the files of a competition authority; these are identical
75 CJEU 14.6.2011—C-360/09, Pfleiderer, ECLI:EU:C:2011:389, no 32.
76 Kersting, Anmerkung zu C-536/11, JZ 2013, 737 (739); Hempel, Einsicht in Kartellverfahrensakten
nach der Transparenzverordnung—Neues aus Luxemburg, EuZW 2014, 29.
77 CJEU 6.6.2013—C-536/11, Donau Chemie, ECLI:EU:C:2013:366, no 43.
78 ‘Leniency statement’ means an oral or written presentation voluntarily provided by, or on behalf of, an
undertaking or a natural person to a competition authority or a record thereof, describing the knowledge
of that undertaking or natural person of a cartel and describing its role therein, which presentation was
drawn up specifically for submission to the competition authority with a view to obtaining immunity or a
reduction of fines under a leniency programme, not including pre-existing information, Art 2 (16)
Directive.
79 ‘Settlement submission’ means a voluntary presentation by, or on behalf of, an undertaking to a
competition authority describing the undertaking’s acknowledgement of, or its renunciation to dispute, its
participation in an infringement of competition law and its responsibility for that infringement of
competition law, which was drawn up specifically to enable the competition authority to apply a
simplified or expedited procedure, Art 2 (18) Directive.
80 Cf Recital 25 DADA.
81 Art 6 (10) DADA.
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to those in Art 6 DADA, in order to block any attempts to circumvent that provision.
In order to make sure that it is not possible to trade with the evidence, Art 7 para 3
DADA also restricts the right to use evidence only obtained by access to the files to
the person that had access or the person that has succeeded to this person’s rights or
has acquired such a person’s claim.82
The possible disclosure of evidence, in particular by competition authorities,
must be considered when evaluating the volume of litigation. The rules discussed
give claimants access to evidence, but at the same time try not to jeopardise public
law enforcement. Whether this very fine balance has been successfully struck seems
doubtful. Given the leeway provided for the domestic courts to balance the interests
at hand, we will observe future court practice and see how and to what extent
applications for disclosure are considered;83 numerous references to the CJEU for
preliminary rulings seem inevitable.84 On the other hand, the rules set out in Art 6
para 5 and 6 DADA (no disclosure of leniency statements and settlement
submissions) fall behind the existing disclosure possibilities in some Member
States; in the Netherlands, in the UK and also in Germany there are means for
further-reaching disclosure of competition authority documents.85 These more
extensive means were created subsequent to the Pfleiderer Case, so that it is
occasionally called into question whether the present rule in Art 6 para 6 DADA,
with its unreserved exclusion of disclosure of leniency statements, is not in conflict
with that CJEU decision. The CJEU after all held that a specific balancing between
the interests of providing the information and the protection of the leniency
statement must be conducted in each case individually.86 Predictably, some Member
States object that Art 6 para 6 DADA conflicts with Art 101 TFEU; in the light of
the (alleged) conflict of this ban on the disclosure of leniency statements and
settlement submissions with primary law, there is even open support for an action
for annulment before the CJEU under Art 263 TFEU.87 The outcome of these
82 All other documents must be disclosed, Art 6 (9) DADA.
83 Thus, apparently, Mederer, EuZW 2013, 847 (849).
84 According to the CJEU in C-536/11, Donau Chemie, ECLI:EU:C:2013:366, no 31; C-360/09,
Pfleiderer, ECLI:EU:C:2011:389, no 34 ,,on a case-by-case basis, […], and taking into account all the
relevant factors in the case’ all interests protected by Union law must be taken into account and, in
particular, there must be a weighing up of the right to damages and the protection of leniency programs.
85 Cf for the Netherlands, for example, Art 843a Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering; for the UK
High Court of Justice, National Grid v ABB & Others [2012] EWHC 869 (Ch); part 31 Rules of Civil
Procedure (CRP); Obersteiner, International antitrust litigation: How to manage multijurisdictional
leniency applications, 4 (2013) ECLR 16 (25); for Germany BVerfG 6.3.2014—1 BvR 3541/13, NJW
2014, 1581; OLG Du¨sseldorf, 22.08.2012—V-4 Kart 5 ? 6/11 (OWi), NZKart 2013, 39 no 44; OLG
Hamm, 26.11.2013—1 VAs 116/13—120/13, 122/13, NZKart 2014, 107 no 36 ff; Bosch, Die
Entwicklung des deutschen und europa¨ischen Kartellrechts, NJW 2014, 1714; Harms/Petrasincu, Die
Beiziehung von Ermittlungsakten im Kartellzivilprozess—Mo¨glichkeit zur Umgehung des Schutzes von
Kronzeugenantra¨gen?, NZKart 2014, 304; Lotze/Smolinski, Einsichtsrecht der Zivilgerichte in Kartell-
Akten, EWiR 2014, 401; Schweitzer, Die neue Richtlinie fu¨r wettbewerbsrechtliche Schadensersatzk-
lagen, NZKart 2014, 335 (342); Yomere/Kresken, Die Entscheidung des OLG Hamm zum Aktenein-
sichtsrecht von Zivilgerichten in Bonusantra¨ge und vertrauliche Kommissionsentscheidungen, WuW
2014, 485 (489).
86 CJEU 14.6.2011—C-360/09, Pfleiderer, ECLI:EU:C:2011:389, no 30.
87 Makatsch/Mir, EuZW 2015, 7 (10).
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efforts is uncertain; as long as Art 6 para 6 DADA has not been declared void, the
Member States must implement the Directive’s provisions. In the longer term,
however, a greater tendency might reveal itself; claimants will get increased access
to important evidence, which will certainly increasingly affect documents held by
competition authorities.
From a practical perspective, various other aspects must still be examined. Under
Art 5 para 1 S 2 DADA, the defendant undertakings can also require the disclosure
of evidence held by the claimant. Given numerous joint plaintiffs, this may very
well lead to a veritable flood of applications; thus, the proceedings must be prepared
very carefully in advance by the claimant with regard to the possible passing-on
defences,88 as related applications for disclosure by the defendants must be
anticipated right at the start of the proceedings.
In any case, the claimant’s application for disclosure necessarily involves high
costs, given the catch 22 situation that the claim for damages must be substantiated
in order for the application for disclosure to be made without, logically enough,
actually knowing the requisite information in advance, as it can only be obtained in
the first place by the disclosure in question. The option allowed by Art 5 para 2
Directive will be helpful here, i.e. to apply for the disclosure of ‘relevant categories
of evidence’, which in turn must be precisely circumscribed; in the words of the
provision ‘as precisely and as narrowly as possible on the basis of reasonably
available facts in the reasoned justification’. How these criteria will be handled in
practice will depend on the skill of the practitioners involved. Here too, many an
application for a preliminary ruling can be expected.
The rule in Art 7 para 2 and 3 DADA will influence the behaviour of the parties
in litigation, because in general claimants usually demand evidence for their
proceedings against the other cartel participants within the context of settlements.
Since Art 7 DADA provides that evidence may only be used by the person who
obtained it by access to the files, or their legal successor, victims may no longer be
able to use the information obtained in the process of settlements which the cartel
participants obtain for disclosure through access to competition authority files.89
Finally, practitioners who take into account the international perspective in cases
of cross-border cartels will have ample opportunity to improve the position of their
clients: under Art 5 para 8 DADA, the Member States may maintain rules or
introduce rules that would lead to a more comprehensive disclosure of evidence. As
already explained,90 some Member States already have such further-reaching
disclosure and other ways of collecting evidence, so practitioners in cross-border
constellations should carefully weigh up which courts’ jurisdictions should be
invoked when bringing claims, which conflicts of laws rules are applied by these
courts, and (finally) which Member States’ substantive laws involve further-
reaching opportunities for disclosure.91
88 No 17, supra.
89 Makatsch/Mir, EuZW 2015, 7 (10).
90 Cf no 28, supra.
91 Cf no 48, infra.
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4.5 Binding effect of the decisions of competition authorities
Before criticising the Directive due to the continued existence of obstacles to
successful damages actions, two other aspects should be considered. With
respect to the protection against disclosure of documents held by the authorities,
it must be taken into account that such authorities not only collect such evidence
but also render decisions as a result. If these decisions by the competition
authorities are binding in any follow-on claim, then a much more promising
picture emerges for the claimant; such a binding effect has thus far been
provided for (as far as is apparent) in respect of the decisions of the European
Commission, as well as those of some Member States, for instance in Germany92
and Austria.93
Now, if a national competition authority has established an infringement of
competition law and rendered a final decision, then under Art 9 para 1 DADA the
national courts are bound by this decision. In respect of final decisions that have
been handed down by national competition authorities in other Member States, Art
9 para 2 DADA provides that these can be submitted as at least prima facie evidence
that there was an infringement of competition law.
Insofar as a final decision of a national or European competition authority94
exists, the volume of litigation must be evaluated anew. The defendant (and co-
defendants) will be prevented from having questions already dealt with in the
proceedings before the competition authority opened up again and thus from
drawing out the proceedings in any subsequent action for damages. The
conceivable objection that this breaches the defendant’s right to be heard is not
tenable, because the defendant has already had the opportunity to fight the
competition authority decision at all instances in that context.95 The main
advantage from a claimant’s perspective would also be that the decision’s binding
effect both takes over from the presumption of damage under Art 17 para 2 DADA
and can settle the question of proportionality in the sense of Art 5 ff DADA to the
claimant’s advantage.
4.6 Limitation
Cartels are often only exposed after a decade or even more. Claims arising at the
time when the cartel started could thus conceivably already be barred before the
claimant knows anything of the cartel or any resulting claims. Hence, the rules on
limitation in Art 10 DADA are intended to ensure that claimants have enough time
to bring any claims for damages.
The limitation period for compensation claims should be at least 5 years and
should not begin to run before the infringement has ended. Moreover, Member
92 Cf Art 33 (4) GWB.
93 Cf § 37a Austrian Cartel Act.
94 Cf Art 16 Regulation (EC) Nr 1/2003 of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of
the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L 001, 1.
95 Rittenauer/Bru¨ckner, wbl 2014, 306 (310).
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States must guarantee that the limitation period only begins to run when four
cumulative conditions have been met: the victim knows or ought to know of the
conduct constituting the infringement, that it has been deemed an infringement of
the competition law of the European Union or of national competition law, of the
fact that he or she has sustained damage as a result, and of the identity of the
infringer that caused the damage. In order to ensure that follow-on claims can also
be brought in good time after there has been a final decision by a competition
authority, the DADA provides for the limitation period to be suspended or
interrupted during the competition authority proceedings, and to remain so for
1 year after the competition authority decision has become final.
Claimants (and legal counsel) will naturally welcome the minimum 5 year
limitation period; this will change the situation in many Member States,96 for
instance in Germany97 and Austria,98 while some other Member States do already
have a five99 or even 6 year100 period.
However, it would seem doubtful whether the rule in Art 10 para 2 DADA,
which provides that any limitation period only starts to run when the victim
knows or ought reasonably to have known, also excludes the maximum absolute
limitation periods which apply regardless of whether there was knowledge in
some Member States.101 In my opinion, the fairly unequivocal wording of
Recital 6 DADA indicates otherwise, as it states the Member States should in
fact have the option of maintaining or introducing generally applicable absolute
limitation periods as long as the duration of them does not make exercise of the
right to full compensation practically impossible or excessively difficult. Since
the balance between the claimant’s interest in private enforcement and the
interest in peace under the law is expressed directly with reference to the
Member State’s rules on absolute limitation periods,102 we believe it is not
likely that many Member States will depart from absolute limitation periods
applicable regardless of whether there was knowledge insofar as they have such
provisions in the first place.103
96 For the inherent methodological problems, see no 21, supra.
97 Cf §§ 195, 199 German Civil Code (BGB); Fiedler, BB 2013, 2179 (2184).
98 Cf § 1489 Austrian Civil Code (ABGB).
99 For example in the Netherlands, cf Art 3:310 (1) Burgerlijk Wetboek; Faure/Hartlief, The
Netherlands, in Koziol/Steininger (eds) European Tort Law 2004 (2005) 420 (422).
100 For example in the United Kingdom for proceedings, cf section 32 Limitation Act; for proceedings
before the CAT, (no 28, supra) the limitation period has thus far only been 2 years, but should as a
consequence of the reforms described above also be raised to 6 years, Morony/Jasper, England and
Wales, in Mobley (ed) Private Antitrust Litigation (2015) 56.
101 Thus, for example, Makatsch/Mir, EuZW 2015, 7 (11), i.e. in the case of Germany more than
10 years; § 199 (3) No 1 BGB.
102 Cf the detailed, comparative law descriptions by Zimmermann/Kleinschmidt, Prescription: Frame-
work and Problems Concercing Damages Claims, in Koziol/Steininger (eds) European Tort Law
2007(2008) 26 (55) no 47 ff.
103 With a different forecast for Germany, Makatsch/Mir, EuZW 2015, 7 (11).
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4.7 Joint and several liability104
Art 11 para 1 DADA establishes the principle of joint and several liability; it
provides that undertakings which have infringed competition law by their collusive
conduct are jointly and severally liable for the damage caused. Each of the
undertakings concerned can be obliged to compensate the entire damage, but can in
turn seek contributions from the other infringers in proportion to their relative
responsibility.105
The concept of joint and several liability is well-founded from a theoretical point
of view. Rules with the same function can be found in several Member States106 and
in more recent academic work on European private law. For instance, Art VI–4:102
of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) provides that ‘[a] person who
participates with, instigates or materially assists another in causing legally relevant
damage is to be regarded as causing that damage’, and consequently such
participants are liable under Art VI–6:105 DCFR solidarily. The Principles of
European Tort Law (PETL), drawn up by prestigious academics in the field,—
though not aimed at representing restatements of European law107—also provide in
Art 9:101 (1) (a) PETL that ‘liability is solidary where the whole or a distinct part
of the damage suffered by the victim is attributable to two or more persons. Liability
is solidary where a person knowingly participates in or instigates or encourages
wrongdoing by others which causes damage to the victim’. Obviously European
104 Art 19 DADA and the effect of consensual settlements on the solidary liability of the cartel
participants will not be discussed here; according to Art 19 (1) DADA, the claim of the settling injured
party is reduced by the settling co-infringer’s share of the harm. The remaining claim may in principle
only be asserted against the cartel participants that did not settle, who in turn may not recover against
the infringer that settled (Art 19 (2) S 2 DADA). While Art 19 (3) provides that the settling victim can
claim the remaining part from the settling infringer should the non-settling infringers not be able to pay,
this can be expressly excluded in the consensual settlement. From a practical perspective, it must be noted
that Art 19 of the Directive probably makes settlements more attractive with the rule that settling
infringers are freed from recourse claims by other infringers. In this manner, the settling infringer’s
secondary duty to compensate can even be excluded when the remaining compensation cannot be
obtained by the non-settling infringers. This also means that in future there will be more disputes
regarding shares of liability, Kru¨ger, Die haftungsrechtliche Privilegierung des Kronzeugen im Außen-
und Innenverha¨ltnis gema¨ß dem Richtlinienvorschlag der Kommission, NZKart 2013, 483 (487).
105 Thus, if an undertaking pays more than its (relative) share for the damage caused to the claimant, it
can in turn take recourse against the co-infringers, and in this respect the amount of this compensation
should be determinable in their internal relationship according to national law; Recital 37 Directive sets
out a number of criteria relevant for deciding the amount of the relative shares (such as turnover, market
share and role within the cartel). This rule is basically in line with existing principles of solidary liability,
cf for example the Austrian position OGH 5 Ob 39/11p = EvBl 2012,557 = ecolex 2012, 392
(Wilhelm) = RdW 2012, 523 = WuW 2012, 1251/KRInt 2012, 393 = ZVR 2013, 76; Koutsoukou/
Pavlova, Der Gerichtsstand der Streitgenossenschaft bei Schadensersatzklagen wegen Verletzung des
EU-Kartellrechts, WuW 2014, 153; Kriechbaumer/Bamberger, Private Enforcement—Die Rechtslage in
O¨sterreich, WuW 2014, 690.
106 See von Bar/Clive, Study Group on a European Civil Code/Research Croup on EC Private Law
(Acquis Group), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame
of Reference (DCFR) (2009) Art VI–4:102, no 1-13 with extensive further reference.
107 Spier, General Introduction in: European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law
(2005) no 31.
Fine to follow-on? Private anti-trust actions in European law 249
123
consensus tends towards joint and several liability for intentional joint conduct as
well as the internal recourse.108
We cannot see why this should not apply here. All the more surprising, therefore, is
the rule adopted by the European legislator to protect whistle-blowers in the context of
solidary liability. According to Art 11 para 4 and para 5 S 2DADA, infringers granted
immunity from fines under a leniency program will only be solidarily liable within
certain limits; in general they are only liable to their own (direct and indirect)
purchasers and suppliers, unless it is impossible to obtain full compensation fromother
cartel participants. A similar limitation is also in place when it comes to other cartel
participants’ recourse claims against the whistle-blowers; the amount of their
contribution toward the compensation may not be higher than the damage which they
have caused to their own direct and indirect purchasers or suppliers.
This privilege would seem—as far as it seems with the exceptions of Hungary109
and Malta110—absent in all European Member States. Very rightly so, as it is
particularly in cases of joint and several liability that privileges applicable outside of
the internal relationship between those jointly liable are avoided. This is mostly in
order to shield the victim from the risk and burden of having to assess the financial
capacities of the individual injuring parties.111 This would be exactly the case here
too: it remains unclear how it would be established that the victim ‘cannot obtain
full compensation’. Is it sufficient that the other cartel participants refuse to pay?
Must they already be insolvent? Or does a failed execution attempt suffice?
Certainly, undertakings infringing European or national competition law will
drag out public prosecution as far as possible, whereas whistle-blowers will not (as
the latter will rarely contest the administration’s decisions). Thus, the decision
against the whistle-blower will be the first to become final. Being the first then
means greater exposure to follow-on damages claims. Nevertheless, this privilege
for whistle-blowers seems excessive, not least because the solution to the underlying
problem is obvious—whistle blowers should be privileged in their relationship
internally to the cartel members but jointly and severally liable in full outside of this
relationship, as is the case in so many Member States.112 This privilege within the
relationship to the co-infringers when it comes to solidary liability is absolutely
sufficient as protection.113
108 Neethling, Toward a European ius comune in tort law, 2006 Fundamina 12-1, 81 (88); Thiede/
Sommer, Vorsa¨tzliche Scha¨digung von Anlegern im europaweiten arbeitsteiligen Wertpapiervertrieb,
O¨BA 2015, 175 (184).
109 And even this appears uncertain in the light of the latest reform of Hungarian liability law, cf
Menyha´rd, Hungary, in Karner/Steininger (eds) European Tort Law 2013 (2014) 305 (311), no 8.
110 See Art 81(3) Police Act as changed by Act IV of 2014: The Various Law (Criminal Matters)
(Amendment) Act 2014 (An Act further to Amend Various Laws related to Criminal Matters): ‘In any
civil proceedings instituted against a protected witness based on the fact that the said witness was the
perpetrator or was an accomplice in the crime on which he tendered evidence, the court shall, if it finds
that the protected witness is responsible for the payment of damages, only hold him liable for such part of
the damage as he may have caused and shall,…, hold him not liable jointly and severally with others.’ Cf
Caruana Demajo/Quintano/Zammit, ETL 2014, no 1.
111 Cf Kru¨ger, NZKart 2013, 483 (486).
112 See the references in no 41.
113 Koch/Thiede, ETL 2014, no 9.
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It is particularly unsatisfactory that the European legislator also privileges
another group of infringers besides the whistle-blowers, namely small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs); after all, these constitute 99% of European undertak-
ings.114 SMEs are liable, under Art 11 para 2 DADA, only to their own purchasers if
at the time of the infringement they had less than 5% market share, full liability
would endanger their economic viability, and their assets would lose all of their
value. Under Art 11 para 3 DADA, this does not apply if the SMEs at issue
organised the infringement or coerced other undertakings to participate, or have
previously been found to have infringed competition law. In respect of this special
protection, the above explanations can be referred to cum grano salis;115 the
questions of when economic viability can be deemed jeopardised and how assets
could ‘lose all their value’ naturally arise.116
In summary, it may be noted that the privilege accorded to whistle-blowers and
the derogation in favour of SMEs unnecessarily complicate the question of joint and
several liability, which gives rise to more leverage for the defendants in the
proceedings.117
5 International dimensions
All of the above makes it clear that in arguably decisive matters (presumption of
damage no 21; evidence no 28, limitation no 38; joint and several liability
no 40), Member States will implement the DADA differently due to the nature of
a European Directive. Indeed, some Member States have already gone further
than the standards set out in the Directive; these standards will apply
(prospectively) even after the transposition of the Directive in the Member
State’s laws.118
Those practitioners who take into consideration the international dimensions of
anti-trust damages actions thus have great opportunities in the case of cross-border
cartels to substantially improve the position of their clients by carefully considering
which courts to bring the action in—and which national law will be applied to
decide the matter on the merits.119
114 Cf on the definition Commission, Recommendation concerning the definition of micro, small and
medium-sized enterprises (2003/361/EC), OJ 2003 L 124, 36 ff as well as Commission, The new SME
Definition (2005) 5 and finally Evaluation of the SME Definition (2012), online http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/policies/sme/files/studies/executive-summary-evaluation-sme-definition_en.pdf 4.
115 Cf no 41.
116 Kersting, WuW 2014, 564 (568).
117 For this reason, Germany, Poland and Slovenia have refused their consent to the Directive’s
compromise in the Council, cf Council Document 14680/14 ADD 1 = 2013/0185 (COD).
118 Cf Art 4 S 2, Art 5 (8), Art 6 (9), Art 10 (4) Directive.
119 This is referred to as forum shopping, on the term see Lurger/Thiede, The International Dimensions of
Law (2015) no 2/13.
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5.1 International jurisdiction
The first question confronting a potential claimant wishing to seek compensation
from an undertaking which has infringed anti-trust law Europe-wide is the court in
which Member State has adjudicary jurisdiction.120 Thus, the first factor is the
international jurisdiction of the Member States.
The needs of the common European market have meant that the European
legislator has been particularly active in the area of international jurisdiction. As
early as 1968, the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcements of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters was adopted by the Member States of
the EuropeanCommunity and came into force in 1973. TheBrussels Conventionwas
subsequently amended by four accession conventions, and was finally replaced (for
fourteen of the then fifteen EC Member States) by Regulation 44/2001 on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcements of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters adopted by the EC Council in December 2000. The ‘recast’ of
the Regulation entered into force on 1 January 2015 (hereafter Brussels I
Regulation). 121 The Regulation, like the earlier Convention, lays down rules on
direct jurisdiction applicable in the court of first instance to determine its own
jurisdiction, and on the recognition and enforcement of judgments of other Member
States of the European Union in which the Regulation applies. In the context of
private enforcement with respect to anti-trust damages actions, international
jurisdiction of the Member State courts is determined primarily by this Brussels I
Regulation (recast). The regulation does not provide specifically for any cartel-
related rules, hence the general rules must be applied.
5.1.1 General jurisdiction at place of defendant’s domicile, Art 4 Brussels I
Regulation
The basic rule concerning direct jurisdiction is enshrined in Art 4 Brussels I Reg-
ulation, which provides that ‘persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever
their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member state.’ The Brussels I Reg-
ulation applies whenever the defendant is domiciled in a Member State, regardless
of whether or not the claimant is situated in the European Union.122 For any
120 The link between implementation of the DADA and the applicable law may only arise indirectly from
the choice-of-law rules in some constellations; namely under Art 3 para 4 Rome I Regulation; Art 14 para
2 Rome II Regulation; Art 14 para 3 Rome II Regulation, Directives must be applied in the form in which
they have been implemented in the Member State whose court is seised.
121 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ
2012 L 351, 1 ff.
122 The rationale for this long-standing rule in favour of the defendant’s domicile was outlined clearly by
the CJEU in Handte v TMCS, ECLI:EU:C:1992:268 noting that the rule reflects the purpose of
strengthening the legal protection of persons established within a particular current national jurisdiction,
and rests on the assumption that a defendant can usually best conduct his or her defence in the courts of
his or her domicile. Another (likely) reason for favouring the defendant over the plaintiff is that the
defendant’s assets are most likely at his place of domicile and enforcement against persons or property
can thus most easily be effected there. Thus, the rule tends to concentrate both adjudication of the merits
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undertakings, Art 4 Brussels I Regulation is extended by Art 63 Brussels I
Regulation; accordingly courts are internationally competent to hear an action
against a defendant undertaking at the place where the registered headquarters or
main branch of the undertaking is situated.
For the following discussion of competent courts in (potentially) other Member
States, we have to keep in mind that the all-important paradigm then deviated from
is set; when it comes to actions against undertakings which have infringed anti-trust
law, it is basically the court of their domicile (viz. their headquarters or main
branch) which has jurisdiction to examine the legal and economic aspects of claims
for anti-trust damages, as well as related cartel-related agreements.
5.1.2 Jurisdiction for contractual matters, Art 7 no 1 Brussels I Regulation
An exaggerated preference for the defendant’s domicile does not provide the most
appropriate solutions in all situations, actions and claims in cross-border cases, as
this mostly takes the defendant’s interests into account. As it seems odd to subjugate
the interests of the claimant to those of the defendant in general, the Brussels I
Regulation provides for particular alternative jurisdictions if the defendant is to be
sued in the courts of a state other than that of his or her domicile. According to the
European legislator, this freedom of choice was introduced in the light of the
existence, in certain well-defined cases, of a particularly close relationship between
the dispute in question and the court where it might be most convenient to adjudge
the matter.
The first exception to the rule on general jurisdiction above is of interest with
regard to an undertaking which violates European or national competition law
where specific contracts were agreed upon which stipulated for that violation of
European or national competition law. According to Art 7 no 1 Brussels I
Regulation, a ‘person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State,
be sued … in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of
performance’. The courts at the place where anti-competitive contractual agree-
ments were performed have jurisdiction when it comes to declaring anti-competitive
contractual agreements null and void. With regard to the topic chosen here, anti-
trust damages under the DADA, we must note that potential claimants will not
merely seek a declaration that a contractual agreement is null and void, but possibly
also seek damages (as provided by the DADA) instead. This latter action for
damages is arguably delictual in nature,123 and could thus, under Art 7 no 2 Brussels
Footnote 122 continued
and enforcement of the judgment in the same country, thereby avoiding unnecessary procedural com-
plications (which were of course also relieved to great extent by the Brussels I Regulation recast).
123 See CJEU 16.5.2013—C-228/11, Melzer/MF Global UK Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2013:305, no 32-35;
CJEU21.6.1978—150/77, Bertrand, ECLI:EU:C:1978:1431, no 14–16; CJEU 17.6.1992—C-26/91,
Handte, ECLI:EU:C:1992:268, no 19; CJEU 19.1.1983—C-89/91, Shearson Lehman Hutton,
ECLI:EU:C:1993:15, no 13; CJEU 3.7.1997—C-269/95, Benincasa, ECLI:EU:C:1997:337, no 12;
CJEU 27.4.1999—C-99/96, Mietz, ECLI:EU:C:1999:202, no 26; CJEU 11.6.2002, C-96/00, Gabriel,
ECLI:EU:C:2002:436.
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I Regulation, open up the possibility of courts in the places where ‘the harmful event
occurred’ having jurisdiction, that is jurisdiction in tort.124
A fascinating follow-up problem125 on the relation between both rules arises
here. Firstly, one may argue that the place of jurisdiction in relation to delict also
decides on contractual, i.e. non-delictual, claims. The CJEU clearly rejected such
annex-jurisdiction with reference to the restrictive interpretation of special
jurisdiction in 1988.126 Vice versa, the delict claims in relation to anti-trust
violations could also be decided at the place of jurisdiction for contract.127 The
latter constellation was submitted to the CJEU only recently, in the Brogsitter
Case128; the Luxembourg judges decided that a claim does not fall outside of Art 7
no 1 Brussels I Regulation just because it is raised on the basis of civil law liability
against the other contractual party, but certainly it does ‘where the conduct
complained of may be considered a breach of contract, which may be established by
taking into account the purpose of the contract’.129 This would be the case in
principle, according to the judges, ‘where the interpretation of the contract which
links the defendant to the applicant is indispensable to establish the lawful or, on the
contrary, unlawful nature of the conduct complained of against the former by the
latter’.130
From the perspective of the practitioner on the ground, the decision in the
Brogsitter Case is questionable, as it could mean that the jurisdiction at the place of
the delict under Art 7 no 2 Brussels I Regulation is impeded.131 If the claimant
brings an action for damages, not at the place of jurisdiction for contractual matters
under Art 7 no 1 Brussels I Regulation, but at the place(s) of jurisdiction for
delictual matters under Art 7 no 2 Brussels I Regulation (the latter being a different
jurisdiction), then the defendant will only need to claim in line with Brogsitter that
his or her conduct was contractually justified, or that an interpretation of the contract
is certainly necessary to judge on the case, and thus that the court in the place of
jurisdiction for contractual matters also has international jurisdiction for delictual
claims. In consequence, a number of actions will be rejected at the place of
jurisdiction for delict due to the annex competence of the courts at the place of
jurisdiction for contract.
124 See no A.Part I.I.A.1.a)i)59, infra.
125 See Dornis, Von Kalfelis zu Brogsitter—ku¨nftig enge Grenzen der Annexkompetenz im europa¨ischen
Vertrags- und Deliktsgerichtsstand, GPR 2014, 352 (353) with further references; Czernich in Czernich/
Kodek/Mayr, Europa¨isches Gerichtsstands- und Vollstreckungsrecht4 (2015) Art 7 EuGVVO no 19.
126 CJEU 27.9.2988—C-189/87, Kalfelis, ECLI:EU:C:1988:459, NB contrary to the view of AG Darmon
cf ECLI:EU:C:1988:312. Cf CJEU 11.10.2007, C-98/06, Freeport plc/Olle Arnoldsson, Slg 2007, I-8319.
127 In favour, for example Kropholler/von Hein, Art 5 EuGVVO no 79, cf on this Spickhoff,
Anspruchskonkurrenzen, Internationale Zusta¨ndigkeit und Internationales Privatrecht, IPRax 2009, 128
ff; Engert/Groh, Internationaler Kapitalanlegerschutz vor dem Bundesgerichtshof, IPRax 2011, 466 with
further references; with a different opinion Gottwald, Anmerkung, IPRax 1989, 272 (274).
128 ECJCJEU 13.3.2014—C-548/12, Brogsitter, ECLI:EU:C:2014:148.
129 CJEU13.3.2014—C-548/12, Brogsitter, ECLI:EU:C:2014:148, no 24 f.
130 CJEU 13.3.2014—C-548/12, Brogsitter, ECLI:EU:C:2014:148, no 25.
131 Mansel/Thorn/Wagner, Europa¨isches Kollisionsrecht 2014: Jahr des Umbruchs, IPRax 2015, 15.
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5.1.3 Place of jurisdiction for delictual matters, Art 7 para 2 Brussels I Regulation
The preference for the place of jurisdiction for contractual matters ultimately fits
into a whole series of unfathomable CJEU decisions on special jurisdiction in
relation to delictual matters; the system arising from these decisions is predom-
inantly shaped by judge-made law and holds a host of uncertainties for the
practitioner.
To start with, Art 7 no 2 Brussels I Regulation stipulates that in matters relating
to torts, delicts or quasi-delicts, a person domiciled in a Member State may sue in
another Member State ‘in the court of the place where the harmful event occurred’.
The application of this rule is unproblematic in cases where the harmful conduct,
that is to say the action eventually leading to the damage, and its result, the damage,
are located in the same country. However, the wording is unclear in cases where the
place where the wrongful action took place and the place where the resulting
damage arose are actually in two countries (delict over a distance). The CJEU held
in the Bier Case132 that the provision must be understood as covering both the place
where the damage occurred and the place where the event giving rise to the damage
took place (ubiquity principle) and, as a rationale, referred to the equal proximity of
both courts to the wrongful conduct or the infringement sustained.
As mentioned, these two places may, and quite frequently do, coincide, but the
rule nevertheless poses problems in cases concerning international divisibility of
damage; it was initially the Shevill Case133 that demonstrated the disadvantages of
this ubiquity principle: following on logically from the Bier decision, the CJEU first
had to confirm that in all those cases in which damage was sustained in numerous
legal systems, the courts both at the place of conduct and in all places of the damage
had international jurisdiction.134 The CJEU became aware of the possibility of
forum shopping and, in response, introduced certain limitations on the choice of
jurisdiction of the plaintiff; the court held that the tortfeasor could be sued at the
place of his wrongful conduct, that is, at his or her domicile, for all harm caused,135
or before the courts of each Member State where damage was sustained by the
victim. However, in the latter case, the courts of each Member State have
jurisdiction solely in respect of the damage caused within their own territory. This
technique was dubbed ‘mosaic assessment’ as it requires, where damage is sustained
in several Member States, that the laws of all Member States concerned will have to
132 CJEU 30.11.1976—21/76, Bier, ECLI:EU:C:1976:166, no 24; Thiede, Internationale Perso¨nlichkeit-
srechtsverletzungen (2010) no 9/10 and recently, for example, CJEU 22.1.2015—C-441/13 Hejduk,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:28, no 18.
133 CJEU 7.3.1995—C-68/93, Shevill, ECLI:EU:C:1995:61, no 32 = IPRax 1997, 111 (Comm Kreuzer/
Klo¨tgen 90) = Rev crit DIP 1996, 487 (Comm Lagarde) = ZEuP 1996, 295 (Comm Huber) = 1 ZZP Int
(1996) 145 (Comm Rauscher).
134 In the Europe-wide cartels at issue here, therefore, this would also be courts in the Member States
where the cartel had a concrete effect on the market.
135 With a different view Wurmnest, Internationale Zusta¨ndigkeit und anwendbares Recht bei
grenzu¨berschreitenden Kartelldelikten, EuZW 2012, 933 (934) (limitation also of the courts at the place
of conduct to the damage that occurred in that state).
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be applied on a distributive basis as tiny pieces, thus only together giving the
complete picture of the mosaic of full compensation.
5.1.3.1 Place of conduct Given that courts at the place of the tortfeasor’s conduct
have full recognition to decide on the entire case, it is essential to determine which
court is that at the place of conduct. In the Shevill Case, this jurisdiction had the
distinct advantage that the defendant caused the Europe-wide damage only at one
place of conduct, namely where it was registered. If this condition is fulfilled, the
general definition of the place of conduct as the place at which the defendant caused
the harmful event by its actions or omissions suffices. For instance, if an
undertaking with a dominant position sells it goods under abusive conditions, and
thus excludes third parties from the market,136 this undertaking undoubtedly acts in
this one Member State and the courts of this one Member State have international
jurisdiction for the action brought by the third party so excluded.
The question, however, is how to proceed when there is no one single place of
conduct, for example when horizontal cartel agreements are at issue. If the place of
conduct is understood as the place at which the forbidden cartel agreement was
concluded, there would only be a clear, single place of conduct in cases where a
cartel was concluded just one time, or at intervals but always in one particular place,
such as at a fair that took place annually in the same city, for instance, and when the
cartel participants then confirmed or modified the cartel during this fair every
year.137 Even at first glance, it is obvious that this sort of ‘organised cartel’138 would
be rather rare, so we are left with the question of how to proceed when participants
in cartels make their agreements over years in many different places around the
world. In that case there is a multitude of places of conduct, and thus the risks of
forum shopping, on the one hand, and undue restriction of claimant jurisdictions, on
the other.
One may argue that the decision to implement the cartel agreement at the
registered seat of the cartel participants should be centre-stage, and here again refer
to the decision in Shevill; in this decision too, the place of conduct was undoubtedly
the domicile of the defendant.139 This leads, however, to a situation where the
special jurisdiction under Art 7 no 2 Brussels I Regulation becomes largely
redundant; after all, the courts at the domicile of the defendant have international
jurisdiction under Art 4 Brussels I Regulation anyway.140 Some accept this and
136 Cf, for example, the Case in OLG Hamburg, 19.4.2007—1 Kart U 5/06, GRUR-RR 2008, 31 (32);
Mankowski, Der europa¨ische Gerichtsstand des Tatortes aus Art 5 Nr 3 EuGVVO bei Schadenersatzk-
lagen bei Kartelldelikten, WuW 2012, 797 (802).
137 Basedow, FS 50 Jahre FIW (2010), 129 (139).
138 Basedow, FS 50 Jahre FIW (2010), 129 (138) thus refers to these kinds of cases as ‘cartels with a
solid organisation’.
139 Cf Mankowski, WuW 2012, 797 (802); Bulst, Internationale Zusta¨ndigkeit, anwendbares Recht und
Schadensberechnung im Kartelldeliktsrecht, EWS 2004, 403 (405).
140 Cf F Bydlinski, Methodenlehre2 (1991) 444: translated here as ‘If a certain interpretation results…, in
(the) provision… becoming devoid of purpose and function, then this interpretation shall not be applied.’
In the specific context cf also Mankowski, WuW 2012, 797 (803); cf also Basedow, FS 50 Jahre FIW
(2010), 129, 137 f.
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argue that it is almost impossible precisely to determine the place of the conduct in
the case of horizontal cartel agreements, and that the place where the cartel was
discussed must be irrelevant from a jurisdictional perspective.141 Finally, the Shevill
Case is drawn upon with respect to the mosaic perspective on the place of the result,
since this perspective would also apply when there is a multitude of places of
conduct and it is argued that when a cartel is discussed and agreed in various
different places, the power of the courts to decide on the case at these different
places must be limited to that damage which arose in each state due to the specific
agreement that was concluded there.142
The last restriction in particular is excessive. Should, for instance, it be clear
where the cartel participants made their arrangements, the court with jurisdiction
there should be competent in respect of the entire damage which arose.143 If no such
single, unambiguous location can be determined, it will be necessary to admit that—
at least for questions of international jurisdiction—there is not a sufficient link
between unlawful conduct and place of jurisdiction.
5.1.3.2 Place of damage According to the interpretation of the CJEU, the so-
called place of the damage is the place where the effects of the event triggering
liability occur to the detriment of the victim.144 Since competition law rules serve
the proper functioning of the market,145 logically the place of the damage must then
be localised by reference to markets, specifically as the place where the defendant’s
infringement affected the market.146
5.1.4 Jurisdiction in relation to connected claims, Art 8 para 1 Brussels I
Regulation
The above discussions clearly demonstrate that the complexity of the jurisdiction
issue must not be underestimated in relation to Europe-wide cartels, for instance in
the case of horizontal agreements. If there is a large number of defendants who
participated in the cartel, it may be that full compensation can only be obtained if
each participant undertaking is sued where it has its registered seat or where the
relevant impact on the market occurred. The only practical way out of this
141 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. and others v. Shell Chemicals UK Ltd. and others [2009] EWHC 2609
(Comm) [65] (claimant is limited to the place of jurisdiction where the result occurred); in consequence
also Bulst, EWS 2004, 403 (405) (place of conduct only where infringer has its seat).
142 Basedow, FS 50 Jahre FIW (2010), 129 (140).
143 With a different opinion Wurmnest, EuZW 2012, 933 (934) pointing to further, possible places of
conduct.
144 CJEU 30.11.1976—21/76, Bier, ECLI:EU:C:1976:166, no 24; CJEU 16.7.2009—C-189/08, Zuid-
Chemie, ECLI:EU:C:2009:475.
145 Bulst, EWS 2004, 403 (406); Mankowski, WuW 2012, 797 (804).
146 Mankowski, WuW 2012, 797 (805); with another opinion Ma¨sch, Vitamine fu¨r Kartellopfer: Forum
shopping im europa¨ischen Kartelldeliktsrecht, IPRax 2005, 509 (516) looking for the centre of financial
interests. Cf also LG Dortmund 1.4.2004—13 O 55/02, EWS 2004, 434 (435) = BeckRS 2010, 02135.
The latter view is, however, in clear contradiction to settled CJEU case law, cf only CJEU 10.6.2004—C-
168/02, Kronhofer, ECLI:EU:C:2004:364, no 19 f.
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dilemma is an action in one place of jurisdiction for closely connected claims
under Art 8 no 1 Brussels I Regulation. This provision provides that several
defendants can be sued together at the court of the state where one of them has his
or her domicile, provided that the claims are so closely connected that it is
expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable
judgments resulting from separate proceedings. In other words, practitioners thus
have the option of examining the respective national implementations of the
DADA (no 49, supra) in the places of general and special jurisdiction where the
members of the cartel are based in this respect and of bringing the action against
one of the undertakings with its domicile in this legal system as the main
defendant, and then to extend the action to all of the other infringers in the cartel
under Art 8 no 1 Brussels I Regulation.
In favour of this approach, it may be said that one of the largest claimants of
anti-trust damages within the context of the so-called bleach cartel, Cartel
Damage Hydrogen Peroxide SA (CDC),147 took exactly this path; presumably in
the light of the claimant-friendly German rules,148 CDC sued six undertakings
(which had already been prosecuted and fined by the European Commission)
with registered seats in different Member States,149 and where only one of which
was based in Germany (as the main defendant), jointly for damages before the
German Regional Court (Landgericht) Dortmund,150 and invoked in this respect
Art 8 no 1 Brussels 1 Regulation.
The subsequent actions taken by CDC seem truly astounding from a strategic,
litigational perspective, and will be described here with the necessary brevity.
After the claim was served on all defendants in the initial proceedings, but before
the time had expired for the submission of answers to the claim and the beginning
of the oral hearing, CDC dropped the proceedings against the German undertaking
(as main defendant) on the basis of a settlement. The Regional Court of
Dortmund151 was thus confronted with the question of whether Art 8 no 1 Brussels
I Regulation is also applicable when the main defendant is no longer being sued at
its place of domicile by the claimant and referred this question to the CJEU.
Although it was rather dubious in the light of the prior Melzer Case152—after all
good arguments can be found for denying the competence of a court based on the
association of claims when the main defendant is no longer part of the
147 CDC is a company with its registered seat in Belgium, which has as its object the assertion of actions
for damages that are ceded to it by some of the undertakings harmed by the hydrogen-peroxide and
sodium perborate cartel either directly or indirectly.
148 Cf no 5, supra.
149 The defendants were Akzo Nobel NV based in the Netherlands, Solvay SA based on Belgium,
Kemira Oyj based in Finland, Arkema France SA based in France (CDC later withdrew the claim against
this defendant), FMC Foret SA based in Spain and Evonik Degussa, which was the only one based in
Germany (former defendant and now intervenor to support Akzo Nobel, Solvay, Kemira and Arkema
France).
150 LG Dortmund, 29.4.2013—13 O (Kart) 23/09, EuZW 2013, 600 = NZKart 2013, 472.
151 LG Dortmund, 29.4.2013—13 O (Kart) 23/09, EuZW 2013, 600 = NZKart 2013, 472.
152 CJEU 16.5.2013—C-228/11, Melzer/MF Global UK Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2013:305; cf on this with
further references Thiede/Sommer, O¨BA 2015, 175 (184).
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proceedings153—the CJEU accepted the German court as internationally compe-
tent to adjudicate on the matter.154
5.2 Applicable law
The next step in our international scenario relates to the applicable substantive
private law. In order to determine which state’s substantive law governs the dispute
at hand, the competent court must determine which choice-of-law rule applies
where an undertaking violates European or national competition law. Then, on that
basis, the court must decide which State’s private law to apply. In other words, after
the court has selected the applicable choice-of-law rule and has made the choice
between the ‘competing’ substantive Member State’s laws it can proceed to
determine the substantive outcome on the basis of the chosen law (and, of course,
the evidence presented by the parties).155
With a view to the introductory cases above, it seems to be obvious that
undertakings engaging in anti-competitive activities, in terms of economic size and
impact, mostly operate on the whole European internal market. As a result,
discussions on the choice-of-law rules nurse fears of a fragmentation of applicable
law; just as in the realm of international jurisdiction,156 a ‘mosaic assessment’
seems possible.157 At first glance, Art 6 para 3 lit a Rome II Regulation158 seems to
prove the point, as this regulation stipulates that the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations arising out of a restriction of competition is the law of the
country where the market is affected. The apprehension in practice is then
constructed along the following lines: assuming that one Member State’s court is
competent to judge the full European violation of competition law, under art 6
para 3 lit a Rome II Regulation each law at the place(s) of anti-competitive actions
must be applied. However, the latter law(s) only have relevance concerning the
impact of that action on the markets of the Member State. Where damage is
153 Cf in detail Harms, Der Gerichtsstand des Sachzusammenhangs bei kartellrechtlichen Schadenser-
satzklagen, EuZW 2014, 129 (130 ff).
154 CJEU 21.5.2015—C-352/13, CDC v Akzo Nobel, ECLI:EU:C:2015:335.
155 Notwithstanding the explanations with respect to implementation of the Directive in no 49, skipping
the test of choice-of-law allows the claimant to choose a court and thereby the substantive law of a
specific jurisdiction which favours him or her as it, for example, awards significant damages or has a
particularly advantageous system of evidence. In other words, the claimant may sway the substantive
legal entitlements to his or her own advantage and, accordingly, to the disadvantage of his or her
opponents. If this was permitted, the law would not serve a neutral and predictable mediatory function
between the parties, and would in essence be unfairly biased against the defendant. The choice-of-law
rules, at times referred to as ‘meta-law’ insofar as they are laws about law, prevent this kind of forum
shopping by parties by rendering only one national legal system exclusively applicable to the case at
hand, regardless of where the claim is litigated and which court is deemed internationally competent. By
basing their decisions as to which law is applicable to cases with a foreign element on the same choice-of-
law rules, all European courts in whichever national jurisdiction are thus ultimately referring to the same
substantive law.
156 See no A.Part I.I.A.1.a)i)59, supra.
157 Wurmnest, EuZW 2012, 933 (938).
158 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, OJ 2007 L 199,
40.
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sustained in several Member States, the laws of all Member States concerned will
have to be applied on a distributive basis as tiny pieces which only reveal the full
picture of the mosaic if seen together, ideally adding up to full compensation. As a
result, the competent Member State’s court would have to assess whether and to
what extent harm occurred in the respective Member State, and how such harm can
be indemnified there. Bearing in mind the differences in each jurisdiction—which
need not disappear, as this is a minimum standard Directive—as well as divergent
codification techniques, such a Herculean task should not be left to judges. Some
raise doubts whether this standard of factual and legal accuracy could ever be met in
practice.159 It is argued, as a practical alternative, that parties might bring their
action solely in respect of the damage caused in the market of one Member State’s
territory. Of course, this way the aggrieved party will either fall short of full
compensation or will have to pursue his or her claims in a number of courts
throughout Europe, which would then clearly miss the goal set by art 3 DADA.160
The fears appearing in the discussions are mostly unfounded. While Art 6 para 3
lit a Rome II Regulation may initially raise alarm with regard to a mosaic
assessment, Art 6 para 3 lit b Rome II Regulation provides a solution to be
commended for those fields where a mosaic assessment is still in play. According to
this provision, where the market is affected in more than one country, the person
seeking compensation for damage (who sues in the court of the domicile of the
defendant) may choose to base his or her claim on the law of the court seized,
provided that the market in that Member State is amongst those directly and
substantially affected by the restriction of competition out of which the non-
contractual obligation on which the claim is based arises. In other words, where
private parties sue for damage caused by a sizable European cartel, they may choose
the law at the domicile of one of the cartelists as the law applicable to the anti-
competitive action in the rest of the world.
6 Summary
The DADA will provide for change in several Member States; national liability laws
will at least undergo amendment in the specific sub-areas discussed in this paper.
The European legislator aspired, on the one hand, to avoid hindering successful
public prosecution by the European and national competition authorities and, on the
other, to create real incentives for private actions for damages against the infringers.
The former aspect explains the somewhat odd rules with respect to whistle-blowers
and leniency programs, the latter the extensive concessions towards potential
claimants, for instance in the presumption of damage and the binding effect of
decisions handed down by authorities. In particular, this binding effect of decisions
by authorities facilitates follow-on claims to a hitherto unknown extent, so that all
practitioners should be advised to keep track of the decisions rendered by
159 Koch/Thiede ETL 2014, no 8.
160 See no 19, supra.
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competition authorities very carefully—and be ready to let corresponding follow-on
claims succeed them.
In the case of such actions, the international dimensions must never be neglected.
If a Europe-wide cartel is at issue, claimants have a range of options to improve
their position if they take into account the different implementations of the Directive
in the various Member States and choose a place of jurisdiction and applicable law
accordingly. If a group of infringers are sued, the claimant should weigh up which
Member State’s law appears particularly favourable and bring the claim against the
main defendant domiciled there.
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